Idaho First Bank v. Bridges Respondent\u27s Brief 3 Dckt. 44532 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
10-11-2017 
Idaho First Bank v. Bridges Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 44532 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Idaho First Bank v. Bridges Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 44532" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & 
Briefs, All. 6972. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6972 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 








IN THE SUPREME COUF.T OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IDAHO FIRST BANK, 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
V. 
MAJ-LE TATE BRIDGES, and HAROLD 
A. BRIDGES, individuals, 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants. 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 44532 
(Dist. Court Case No. CV-2015-145-C) 
CROSS-APPELLANTS MAJ-LE TATE BRIDGES AND HAROLD A. BRIDGES' 
REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT, District Judge, presiding 
William H. Thomas, ISB #3154 
Daniel E. Williams, ISB #3920 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
9th & Idaho Center 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 810 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 345-7800 
(208) 345-7894 (fax) 
wmthomas@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB 1687 
Jason R. Mau, ISB #8440 
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 319-2600 
(208) 319-2601 (fax) 
fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com 
j mau@greenerlaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
II. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 2 
A. The District Court's Dismissal ofIFB's Deficiency Claim Should be Affirmed ................. 2 
1. I.A.R. 13 grants the jurisdiction to enforce the final judgment. ....................................... 3 
2. The Uniform Arbitration Act does not provide the support or context argued by IFB. ... 4 
3. IFB is precluded from pursuing its claim in another forum .............................................. 5 
4. The arbitrator should not be allowed to interpret the final judgment. .............................. 7 
5. The Supreme Court has recognized that, based upon equitable principles, creditors are 
not allowed to seek additional deficiency recovery in a subsequent action if not pursued 
in the original action ......................................................................................................... 8 
6. Arbitration is not the forum to re-litigate key issues previously decided by courts ......... 9 
B. IFB Provides Scant Support to Claim that its Cross-Collateralization Provision is 
Effective .............................................................................................................................. 10 
C. The Bridges are entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal.. .................................................... 11 
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
AgStar Financial Services, ACA v. Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., 161 Idaho 801,391 P.3d 
1271 (2017) ........................................................................................................................... 8, 10 
Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205 P.3d 1209 (2009) .................................................... 9, 10 
Bryan Cty. v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 638 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 2006) ....................................... 7 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987) ........................... 3 
In re Y & A Group Sec. Litigation, 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994) .................................................... 7 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) ..................................................... 11 
John HancockMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1998) ........................................ 7 
Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116,219 P.3d 440 (2009) ........................ 6 
Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................... 9 
Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Biehl, 42 Idaho 47,245 P. 88 (1926) ................................................ 8 
Prehn v. Hodge, 161 Idaho 321, 385 P.3d 876 (2016) ................................................................. 11 
Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,224 P.3d 468 (2009) ................................. 6, 7 
Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007) ........................................................... 6 
Statutes 
Idaho Code§ 7-902 ..................................................................................................................... 4, 5 
Idaho Code §12-120(3) ................................................................................................................. 11 
Rules 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13 ......................................................................................................... 2, 3, 4 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60 ................................................................................................... 2 
Other Authorities 
Restat 2d of Judgments, § 25 (2nd 1982) ....................................................................................... 6 
11 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Bridges' cross-appeal addresses Idaho First Bank's ("IFB") attempt to recover in 
arbitration on the deficiency the District Court previously barred. The District Court ruled that 
IFB's deficiency action was dismissed with prejudice. (R., p. 351.) IFB has collaterally attacked 
this judgment by attempting to foreclose a separate deed of trust on Boise residential property for 
the sole purpose of recovering the amount already barred under LC. § 45-1512. Despite the 
District Court's ruling, IFB claimed it could still recover the full amount of its claimed 
deficiency by enforcing a cross-collateralization provision in the separate deed of trust. 
However, IFB had previously attempted to enforce its rights to collect when it filed its Second 
Amended Complaint in the action before the District Court. (R., pp. 38-61.) This Second 
Amended Complaint contained no claim based on the theory it had subsequently pursued in 
arbitration, even though the current claim is related to the same facts and circumstances, with the 
same parties, as its claims before the District Court. That litigation properly placed the issue of 
amounts due under the Cabin Note clearly before the court. For apparently strategic reasons, 
IFB only chose to pursue two theories at that time (its Rule 13 and Article Nine arguments) and 
neglected to pursue any cross-collateralization arguments to support recovery of the deficiency 
as it was obliged to pursue. (See id.) 
Instead, IFB continued to focus solely on these two theories in opposition to the Bridges' 
motion for summary judgment and in its motion for reconsideration. (See R., pp. 282-83, 822-
25.) Although given a full and fair opportunity to present all theories supporting an attempt to 
collect the deficiency, IFB elected to not introduce its cross-collateralization claims to support its 
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lawsuit. Consequently, the District Court's August 1, 2016 Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider concluded that IFB was unable to present a legal reason entitling it to recover the 
deficiency. (R., pp. 822-25.) 
The Bridges have continually argued that the District Court's final judgment precludes 
IFB's attempt to pursue its afterthought and alternative argument in a new forum. IFB's Cross-
Respondent's Brief fails to address preclusion issues, and instead focuses on Idaho's Uniform 
Arbitration Act (the "Act"), jurisdiction, and cross-collateralization clauses to give support to a 
regularly pursued matter; however, the Bridges maintain that Idaho law should not allow IFB the 
proverbial second bite of the apple or countenance IFB's wasteful and unfair re-litigation of the 
issue before a different forum. Therefore, the Bridges argue that the District Court incorrectly 
denied the motion they brought under IAR 13 and IRCP 60. IFB should be prevented from 
changing the forum to AAA arbitration as the dismissal of the deficiency action with prejudice 
precluded further claims attempting to resurrect the deficiency under the Cabin Note. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court's Dismissal of IFB's Deficiency Claim Should be Affirmed. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(6) and (13) allow the District Court to rule during a pending 
appeal on I.R.C.P. 60 motions and in matters related to the enforcement of any judgment or 
order. Rule 60 motions for relief from a judgment or order may be pursued for reasons of 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief. I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(l) and (6). The District Court stated that the judgment awarded the Bridges with 
"complete relief," dismissing IFB's deficiency claims with prejudice. (R., p. 959-960.) It also 
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stated that the judgment awarded IFB no relief on its deficiency claims and that the arbitration 
proceeding was somehow not an attempt to re-litigate the deficiency claims. (R., p. 960.) Thus, 
it wrongly concluded that the Bridges were not seeking enforcement of the judgment, but an 
expansion of the judgment. (Id.) In doing so, the District Court enabled IFB to undermine the 
judgment and overcome its previous failure to pursue all arguments in favor of its deficiency 
claim. 
1. I.A.R. 13 grants the jurisdiction to enforce the final judgment. 
IFB has been seeking a personal judgment against the Bridges on the Cabin Note since it 
first filed a complaint on June 19, 2015. Initially, IFB was seeking a judgment for the full Cabin 
Note amount. (See R., pp. 7-19.) Then, after selling the collateral, IFB filed an untimely 
deficiency action seeking a judgment for the resulting claimed deficiency on the Cabin Note. See 
R., pp. 38-61.) Once IFB realized that its claims would likely fail on appeal, it suddenly decided 
that it wanted to arbitrate alternative arguments regarding its deficiency claim. Up to this point 
in the litigation, IFB never mentioned this alternative position that it apparently believes trumps 
everything the District Court had already ruled. Allowing IFB to now pursue its claims in 
arbitration would render the litigation process practically meaningless. See, e.g., Hansen v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 670-71, 735 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1987) (finding that State 
Farm waived right to arbitration after submitting to the jurisdiction of the district court and 
proceeding with litigation, recognizing that when it appeared that things were not going its way, 
State Farm wanted out of the consequences of litigation). Basically, IFB is trying to avoid the 
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consequences of its failure in litigation and hoping the arbitrator would ignore the effect of the 
District Court's final judgment. 
The District Court, however, refused to exercise the jurisdiction prescribed in LA.R. 
13(b) to enforce its judgment and instead found, without citation to any authority, that it lacked 
jurisdiction under LA.R. 13(b)(13), suggesting incorrectly that the relief sought was not to 
enforce the judgment but to expand it. By the very nature of the Bridges' pleading seeking relief 
on the theory of claim preclusion, it is evident that the question of enforcement was at issue. 
Had no final judgment been filed, the Bridges would have no basis to rely on the claim 
preclusion principle. The court's refusal to enforce the judgment allows IFB to argue that the 
deficiency claim that was dismissed with prejudice can be resurrected and recovered in a 
separate forum by alternate means, and opens up the prospect for a contradictory holding 
undermining the finality of the judgment. As it is, IFB is allowed to split its claim in violation of 
res judicata principles. 
2. The Uniform Arbitration Act does not provide the support or context argued by 
IFB. 
A voiding the claim preclusion issue in its responsive brief, IFB contends that the Act bars 
the Bridges' position. IFB suggests that the Bridges are unable to overcome the statutory 
requirements for compelling or staying arbitration found in LC. § 7-902. More specifically, IFB 
cites to LC. § 7-902(e), arguing that the Bridges failed to show that IFB's arbitration action 
lacked merit or bona fides per that provision's requirements. However, the Act has no 
applicability to the current issues. 
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Idaho Code § 7-902 applies to both a motion to compel arbitration and a motion to stay 
arbitration. See LC.§ 7-902 ((a) "[o]n application of a party ... the court shall order the parties 
to proceed"; (b )"[ o ]n application, the court may stay"; ( c) "application [for arbitration] shall be 
made"; (d) "if an order for arbitration [to stay] or an application therefor has been made"; 
(e) "[a]n order for arbitration .... "). Neither was filed in this or any other action. The Bridges 
did not ask the District Court to stay the arbitration; they requested that the judgment be enforced 
so that IFB would be prevented from pursuing its claims in another forum. Therefore, IFB's cite 
to LC. § 7-902(e) provides no support to its contention that the Uniform Arbitration Act provides 
the context necessary to uphold the District Court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction to ensure 
enforcement of its judgment. 
3. IFB is precluded from pursuing its claim in another forum. 
The District Court also refused to address the Bridges' main contention - that any 
arguments that amounts are still owed on the Cabin Note and recoverable against any of the 
Bridges' assets are now precluded by the District Court's final judgment under the principle of 
claim preclusion. The Bridges are not contesting that IFB has initiated an arbitration proceeding, 
they contest the attempt to use that forum to address issues that have already been litigated or 
could have been litigated before the District Court. The arbitration's sole purpose was seeking 
an alternative route to recovering under the Cabin Note. Claim preclusion is intended to prevent 
exactly that - it precludes subsequent actions on issues that could have been raised in the primary 
litigation between parties. Thus, the Bridges have asked the court to enforce its judgment so that 
IFB cannot pursue a claim that is precluded by law. 
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The principle of claim preclusion was developed to protect parties from the harassment of 
repetitive claims. Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 125, 157 P.3d 613, 619 (2007). Courts 
are also protected from an added caseload from claims that should have been litigated by parties 
in a previous related case. Id. at 126, 157 P.3d at 620. Claim preclusion has been broadly 
applied in Idaho courts in such a manner that the doctrine's application does not require 
substantial overlap of theories, but only that there is a final judgment, the same parties involved, 
and a claim that arises out of the same series of transactions to which the original cause arose. 
Id.; Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120, 219 P.3d 440, 444 (2009). 
Basically, litigants are barred from pursuing any claims that are related to the same cause of 
action that was made or should have been made in previous litigation between the same parties. 
Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,411,224 P.3d 468,478 (2009). This includes 
remedies not sought in the initial litigation. Restat 2d of Judgments, § 25 (2nd 1982). 
IFB does not deny that its arbitration demand sought recovery under the Cabin Note-the 
same recovery it sought in the underlying litigation. (Appellant/Cross-Respondent's Brief, p. 4.) 
Its arguments in response to the Bridges' appeal, unsurprisingly, focus entirely on the District 
Court's decision and does not contravene the Bridges' preclusion arguments. IFB dwells on 
language from that decision framing the Bridges' motion as seeking to expand their recovery to 
include "an additional measures of relief that they didn't seek: a declaratory judgment that the 
remaining balance of the 2006 [Cabin] loan is extinguished and not collectible by resort to 
collateral other than the McCall cabin." Id. In so ruling, the District Court ignored fundamental 
claim preclusion principles that should have been applied to protect, not punish, the Bridges. 
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4. The arbitrator should not be allowed to interpret the final judgment. 
IFB also fails to address the fact that the preclusive effect of the final judgment will 
ultimately need to be an issue decided by an Idaho court and not an arbitrator. While IFB 
suggests an advisory opinion is sought by the Bridges and that the arbitrator should instead 
address this significant issue, it provides no authority that the arbitrator has the authority to rule 
on this issue. The Bridges have already shown that other jurisdictions have recognized that the 
proper forum for determining the reach of claim preclusion on a final judgment should be 
resolved by the courts, not arbitrators. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Glick, 151 F.3d 132, 
139 (3d Cir. 1998). 
As the Bridges already underscored in their opening brief, a court - not an arbitrator - "is 
the best interpreter of its own judgment." In re Y & A Group Sec. Litigation, 38 F.3d 380, 383 
(8th Cir. 1994). Ultimately, the Bridges contend that the issue not reached in Storey 
Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho at 405-7, 224 P.3d at 472-4, should now be addressed in 
Idaho-whether res judicata issues should be resolved by a court and not an arbitrator. See, e.g., 
Bryan Cty. v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 638 S.E.2d 302, 304-05 (Ga. 2006) ("The principle 
stated ... is that 'even when arbitration is involved ... 'courts should not have to stand by while 
parties re-assert claims that have already been resolved.' 'No matter what, courts have the power 
to defend their judgments as res judicata, including the power to enjoin or stay subsequent 
arbitrations.'") (internal citations omitted). 
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5. The Supreme Court has recognized that, based upon equitable principles, 
creditors are not allowed to seek additional deficiency recovery in a subsequent 
action if not pursued in the original action. 
This Court has very recently expressed its view that equitable principles are applicable to 
debtor/creditor issues pertaining to deficiency judgments. In AgStar Financial Services, ACA v. 
Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc. the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of equitable 
principles in deficiency matters. Most applicable to this case is that in the Court's review of 
previous cases, it realized that reasonable resolutions were reached after a balancing of the 
equities between the creditors and debtors. 161 Idaho 801, 813, 391 P.3d 1271, 1283 (2017). 
The District Court did not have the benefit of the AgStar decision when it ruled that the 
arbitration could proceed. However, these principles have application here even though the 
factual construct of AgStar was different. Of particular import here was AgStar 's review of 
Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Biehl, 42 Idaho 47, 245 P. 88 (1926). "[Portland Cattle] is of 
interest because it holds that where a creditor forecloses against a portion of its security and 
obtains a deficiency judgment, it cannot then seek to recover against the additional security that 
was not sought in the first instance." 161 Idaho at 812, 391 P.3d at 1282. 
Here, IFB sought to recover from security in the underlying action that was separate and 
distinct from the security it now seeks to recover in its arbitration demand. Under the principles 
reviewed in AgStar and drawn from Portland Cattle, regardless of the fact that IFB is unable to 
recover based on claim preclusion, equity also bars IFB from seeking to recover by means it 
chose not to pursue initially. Therefore, AgStar's equitable principles provide additional grounds 
to reverse the District Court. 
8 
6. Arbitration is not the forum to re-litigate key issues previously decided by 
courts. 
Finally, IFB has failed to address the Bridges' argument that by pursuing litigation on the 
deficiency issue, it has waived its right to pursue arbitration on any claims related to the 
deficiency. IFB does not even attempt to argue that its arbitration demand is unrelated to its 
litigation, it just argues that its demand is beyond the reach of the courts in part because of this 
appeal. However, no authority permits IFB to use the pendency of an appeal to prohibit basic 
legal principles from applying to an attempt to re-litigate an issue in another forum. 
The Bridges have cited to Borah v. McCandless, in support of their contention that IFB 
cannot be allowed to pursue a claim in arbitration that it had already litigated, no matter the 
timing of the demand. While most precedent related to the arbitration waiver issue applies to 
arbitration demands made during the ongoing litigation (see, e.g., Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 
1118 (9th Cir. 2016)), in Borah, the issue was addressed because the appellant first argued on 
appeal that an arbitration clause deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and the 
court could not therefore resolve the breach of contract claim. 147 Idaho 73, 77-8, 205 P.3d 
1209, 1213-4 (2009). The Supreme Court found that the applicant, even in waiting to raise the 
issue on appeal, had waived his right to rely on the arbitration clause and cited to cases finding 
waiver where the arbitration was pursued by the party initiating, and still participating in, 
litigation. Id. at 78-9, 205 P.3d at 1214-5. The jurisdictional and procedural differences in 
Borah do not prevent the application of the waiver principle here. 
Basically, since IFB's arbitration demand relates to its attempt to collect on the Cabin 
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Note, IFB is attempting to avoid the adverse ruling by looking to arbitration and claiming no 
jurisdiction, like the appellant in Borah. The only difference here is that IFB did not wait until 
arguments were filed on appeal and instead tested the waters while the appeal was still pending. 
Thus, the case law is just as applicable to the present case as it was in Borah-IFB has waived 
the benefit of the arbitration clause, as far as it applies to the deficiency on the Cabin Note, by 
proceeding with litigation on that issue. Unfortunately, the District Court erred by not applying, 
at the very least, the waiver doctrine thereby giving IFB an opportunity to re-litigate matters in a 
different forum. 
B. IFB Provides Scant Support to Claim that its Cross-Collateralization Provision is 
Effective. 
IFB's responsive brief does not provide any authority of substance to counter the 
arguments opposing the application of the cross-collateralization provision. IFB tries to 
differentiate between contemporaneous waivers and subsequent waivers of deficiency upon 
obtaining a loan. However, IFB presents no authority to support an argument that such waivers 
are or should be viewed differently in the eyes of a court. Similarly, IFB claims that Idaho does 
not disfavor deficiency claims which is at least inconsistent with this Court's announced 
principles in AgStar. 
Further, IFB decries the Bridges' use of persuasive authority in support of its arguments. 
Surprisingly, the only authority that IFB does cite to in support of its cross-collateralization 
provision is from Alaska and Kentucky despite its hostility to foreign authority stated only one 
sentence earlier. Overall, IFB' s scant support for the applicability of its cross-collateralization is 
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truly, in IFB's own words, "unavailing." In sum, IFB has failed to advance any cogent reasons 
why its cross-collateralization provision should be enforced. 
C. The Bridges are entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal. 
Finally, in response to the Bridges' argument entitling them to fees on appeal, IFB simply 
states that the Bridges' appeal is not a commercial transaction under LC. § 12-120(3). However, 
LC. § 12-120(3) clearly provides for fees to the prevailing party for any actions based on a note. 
Prehn v. Hodge, 161 Idaho 321, 385 P.3d 876, 887 (2016). As the Bridges stated in their Joint 
Respondents' and Cross-Appellants' Brief, the litigation is, if nothing else, an effort to recover 
under the promissory note . For attorney fee award purposes under the statute, the crucial test is 
whether the transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit and the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 
(2008). IFB cannot dispute the primary role the note plays in this litigation. Therefore, if the 
Bridges are found to be the prevailing party on appeal, they are entitled to attorney fees under 
LC. § 12-120(3). 
III. CONCLUSION 
As described above, the District Court erred when it failed to enforce its judgment and 
refused to exercise jurisdiction, with the result being that the Bridges were afforded no protection 
for the relief they had previously pursued to final judgment below. For the reasons stated above, 
the Bridges respectfully request that the Court reverse the District Court's order that failed to 
apply res judicata principles to bar IFB's untimely attempt to raise a cross-collateralization 
argument to collaterally attack the final judgment, a result that is also supported by equity as 
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recently applied by the Court to debtor-creditor relationships. Further, this Court should proceed 
to the substantive determination that the cross-collateralization provisions in the Deed of Trust 
encumbering their Boise home cannot be enforced against the Bridges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11 th da of October, 2017. 
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Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
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